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1. INTRODUCTION  
Questions about the value of art are nothing new. Lovers of art have been asked to explain its 
importance since the time of Plato’s Republic. We encounter one common line of defence in 
Kierkegaard’s writings. Like many 19th century thinkers, including the leading figures of the Idealist 
and Romantic movements (Speight 2015; Zuckert 2010), Kierkegaard embraced a ‘cognitivist’ 
picture of the arts. He located art’s value in its ability to teach or educate—to provide us with 
cognitive benefits. 
Kierkegaard’s version of cognitivism has a predictable existentialist twist. He is not as 
interested as Hegel or Schelling in whether art can express general truths about the spirit of the age. 
Nor is he as concerned as Kant with whether art manages to provide us with concrete 
representations of abstract ideas. Kierkegaard focuses his attention on art’s ability to teach us about 
ourselves. Works of art matter to him because they can help us with the project of discovering who 
we are as individuals. 
Despite cognitivism’s popularity, it also received pushback in Kierkegaard’s day. Some critics 
complained that what art accomplishes does not exactly amount to teaching. Others conceded that 
art might manage to teach in some sense, but they objected that it does not do so as well as 
philosophy or the sciences. The lessons communicated through art, they claimed, are never as clear-
cut or well-supported by reasons.  
The goal of this chapter is to explain how Kierkegaard turns these objections on their heads. 
I will argue that he does so by making two moves. First, he maintains that works of art do not teach 
‘directly’ by telling us truths and offering us evidence. Instead, art educates in an ‘indirect’ fashion 
by helping us make our own discoveries. Second, the fact that art does not teach in a straightforward 
manner is not a defect. On the contrary, it is precisely because art teaches indirectly that it teaches 
better than philosophy and the sciences. 
2. PHILOSOPHICAL OBJECTIONS TO COGNITIVISM 
To appreciate Kierkegaard’s contributions to the cognitivist tradition, we must set them against the 
backdrop of two well-known challenges. The first challenge is the ‘no assertions’ objection. It states 
that, on a traditional view, educating people involves giving them truths they need to know. The 
problem with most works of art is that they do not try to impart any truths. They do not even make 
any claims or assertions about the way the world goes. Thus, they cannot be said to teach in the 
traditional sense. 
The second major challenge to the cognitivist view of art is the ‘no reasons’ objection. It 
points out that teaching is more than offering people truths. Real teaching requires providing people 
with knowledge. People have knowledge only when they have justifications for what they take to be 




true. Thus, the deeper problem with works of art is that, even when they do convey truths, they 
often fail to support them with justifications—i.e. reasons, arguments, or evidence.  
These two objections have received much attention in contemporary aesthetics. But they are 
not peculiar to our times. Their pedigree extends back to Plato’s argument in the Republic for thinking 
art should be banished from the ideal city. They also stand behind the view held by many 
philosophers in the modern era that art is not as reliable a path to the truth as science (Carroll 2003, 
pp. 368–369; Kivy 1997, pp. 84–119). Finally, we catch glimpses of the two objections in the 
reasoning presented by Hegel for his ‘end of art’ thesis. Despite the educational function art has 
served throughout history, Hegel claimed, it ultimately must be replaced by philosophy. For 
philosophy is a more transparent medium for communicating truths (Hegel 1975, pp. 10–11; see 
Beiser 2005, pp. 286–297; Pattison 1992, pp. 14–16). 
It should not surprise us, therefore, that Kierkegaard alludes to the two objections in his 
writings. At times he even does so sympathetically. Sylvia Walsh (1994, pp. 170–173) calls attention 
to passages in Either/Or, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and Works of Love that characterize art as a 
deficient teacher, one that fails to present the world as it actually is. Elsewhere Kierkegaard describes 
a passion for art as a preoccupation with a realm other than our own; it is a flight from reality into 
fantasy (SUD, 77–78 / SKS 11, 191; CUP, 1.387–390 / SKS 7, 352–356). In his most critical 
moments, he appears to agree with Plato: ‘the poet is, in a godly sense, the most dangerous of all’ 
(TM, 225 / SKS 13, 281). Such passages lead Kai Hammermeister to conclude ‘Kierkegaard 
associates the aesthetic more or less with deception and corruption’ (2002, p. 130). 
3. KIERKEGAARD’S COGNITIVISM ABOUT THE ARTS 
Kierkegaard’s negative comments about art should not unduly colour our interpretation. For he 
usually restricts them to particular kinds of art or specific approaches to art. When we take a holistic 
look at his writings on the subject, it becomes apparent that he has a positive conception of the role 
art can play in human life. As noted at the outset, we can think of Kierkegaard as falling in line with 
the Idealists and Romantics on this issue. However much he disagrees with them elsewhere, he 
shares their view of the importance of art. He too believes art matters because it has the power to 
educate us about the world and ourselves. 
Hints of Kierkegaard’s cognitivist view of the arts appear in his account of Thomasine 
Gyllembourg’s first novel, A Story of Everyday Life. He praises the book because it reveals the way 
life actually is. It offers readers ‘an explanation of life or a strengthening of their understanding of 
it’ (TA, 22 / SKS 8, 25). To some it is even ‘a guide’ (TA, 22 / SKS 8, 25). Kierkegaard’s cognitivism 
also comes across in what Ettore Rocca (1999) describes as his call for a ‘second aesthetics’ in which 
poets express new ideals for living (JP, 2.288-289 / SKS 24, 82-83 ; see also McDonald 2014, p. 26). 
Kierkegaard’s clearest statements on the value of art, however, occur in the context of his defence 
of his own attempts at literature. He turns to a literary or poetic format because he considers it the 
best way to help readers learn. Indeed, when it comes to ethics and religion, good instruction has to 
be artistic (CUP, 1.79, 242-243 / SKS 7, 29, 220-221; PV, 43, 54 / SKS 16, 25-26, 35; PC, 94, 123, 
133-144 / SKS 12, 103, 128-129, 137-147 ; see Aumann 2010). Thus, in the mind of Kierkegaard, 




the Hegelians have it backwards. Art rather than philosophy or science is the superior way to educate 
people. 
Kierkegaard is an important member of the cognitivist tradition for several reasons. Chief 
among them is that his version of cognitivism contains a couple of insights that allow him to avoid 
the objections just described. His first insight is that philosophers often presuppose a narrow view of 
teaching. They tend to assume that teaching involves imparting truths and supporting these truths 
with reasons. To use Kierkegaard’s terminology, when philosophers talk about teaching, they restrict 
their focus to the ‘communication of knowledge’ or ‘direct communication.’ 
If the ‘direct’ model of teaching were the only one, the standard objections to cognitivism 
would go through. Art would be an impoverished educator because it seldom follows the ‘truth plus 
justification’ pattern. But, and this is Kierkegaard’s second insight, the direct model is not the only 
legitimate model. It may reflect the stereotypical way instruction occurs in philosophy or the ideal 
pursued in the sciences, but it does not capture how instruction happens in art. When works of art 
teach, they tend to do so indirectly rather than directly. They educate us without asserting truths or 
offering reasons to believe them. 
Kierkegaard’s writings contain several accounts of art’s indirect method of instruction or 
what he calls ‘indirect communication’ (JP, 1.267-293 / SKS 27, 390-434; CUP, 1.72-80, 242-299 / 
SKS 7, 73-80, 220-273; PC, 123-144 / SKS 12, 128-147; PV, 41-56 / SKS 16, 23-36). The details of 
these accounts differ, but the central idea remains the same. Rather than straightforwardly telling us 
the truth, art indirectly teaches us by empowering us to uncover the truth for ourselves. It provides 
us with the tools, training, and background resources we need to make discoveries on our own. For 
this reason, Kierkegaard describes indirect communication as ‘the communication of capability’ 
rather than ‘the communication of knowledge’ (JP, 1.281-290 / SKS 27, 404-414). The implication 
here is that the indirect method does not involve giving people new information to know. Instead, 
it involves helping people cultivate the ability to learn new things on their own. The aim, as 
Kierkegaard puts it, is to help the learner ‘stand alone’ (JP, 1.280 / SKS 27, 403; WL, 274-270 / SKS 
9, 272-273). 
To further explain indirect communication, Kierkegaard draws on Socrates’s metaphor of 
midwifery or ‘maieutics’ (PV, 7-9 / SKS 13, 13-15; CUP, 1.80 / SKS 7, 80; JP, 1.274-280 / SKS 27, 
397-403; see also Aumann 2010, pp. 297–305; Daise 1999). The maieutic teacher does not give birth 
to his or her own knowledge and then pass it along to the learner. He or she rather helps learners 
‘give birth’ to their own knowledge just as the midwife draws the infant from the mother. More 
perspicuously, the maieutic teacher induces learners to arrive at the relevant lesson on their own 
rather than straightforwardly telling it to them. 
One qualification to this picture deserves our attention. Although Kierkegaard often 
associates art with indirect communication, he does not identify the two (CUP, 1.251-300 / 7, 228-
273; see Aumann 2008, pp. 30–57, 2010). He does not reduce art to indirect communication or 
indirect communication to art. It is possible, he says, to teach indirectly without using artistic means. 
One prominent example comes from Socrates. His question-asking method counts as indirect 
communication even though it does not amount to fine art (CUP, 1.277-278 / SKS 7, 251-254). For 
it too prompts learners to reason under their own steam to a conclusion rather than handing it over 




to them as a finished product. In addition, Kierkegaard claims that some works of art attempt to 
teach us directly rather than indirectly. They are didactic by nature, sometimes even beating us over 
the head with their theses and badgering us into accepting their points of view (see TA, 34-35, 41 / 
SKS 8, 34-35, 41). Finally, Kierkegaard acknowledges that many artworks do not teach us at all. 
Some attempt to assist us with the learning process but fail; the tools, training, or resources they 
offer us are flawed. Other works of art do not even try to help us. They serve as diversions from 
the task of learning rather than occasions to pursue it. Works of these last two sorts are among the 
targets of Kierkegaard’s negative remarks about art mentioned above. 
4. ARTISTIC METHODS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION 
There are a number of specific ways in which art teaches us indirectly, according to Kierkegaard. 
Chief among them is by providing us with cognitive tools we can use to enhance our understanding 
of our lives. In particular, works of art help us by offering us lenses’ through which to see ourselves 
better or prisms through which to view the world around us afresh. These lenses or prisms can 
focus our attention on considerations we have overlooked. They also have the power to structure 
our conception of the world in ways we could not have imagined on our own. 
Kierkegaard’s way of expressing the point is to say works of art can serve as ‘mirrors’ for 
ourselves (FSE, 25-26, 40-44 / SKS 13, 53-54, 66-70; see Stokes 2009, pp. 111–133). He is most 
explicit about this way of framing the idea when it comes to his own literary writings.  Indeed, as 
the motto for one of his books, he uses the saying ‘Such works are mirrors: when an ape looks in, 
no apostle can look out’ (SLW 8 / SKS 6, 16). Kierkegaard’s idea here is that, if we attend carefully 
to the stories he gives us, we can see reflections of ourselves in the characters they describe. 
Works of art that serve the kind of mirroring function Kierkegaard has in mind may not 
themselves contain much knowledge. The standard philosophical objections may be right that they 
offer us little in the way of truth-plus-justification. Thus, Kierkegaard admits in his journals that in 
many cases of indirect communication ‘there is no object’ or ‘the object drops out’ (JP, 1.270-271 / 
SKS 27, 395). What he means here is that there is no piece of knowledge or bit of information 
conveyed from teacher to learner. Nevertheless, works of art that serve a mirroring function still 
have cognitive value because we can use them to acquire knowledge about the world and ourselves. 
In fact, like ordinary mirrors, they may enable us to discover things we would otherwise miss. They 
may reflect back to us truths about ourselves we are too myopic to see on our own. 
5. ART AS MIRROR OF THE SELF 
Kierkegaard’s idea that works of art can serve as mirrors for ourselves is a fruitful one. Although 
not always owing to his influence, it is also one that has received attention in contemporary 
aesthetics (e.g. Danto 1981). Perhaps the most lucid account of the art-as-mirror-of-the-self view 
occurs in the work of Elisabeth Camp. It is worth taking a moment to explain her view. 
Camp (2009) distinguishes between two ways we can see ourselves in the characters we 
encounter in works of literature. The first, called ‘pretense,’ involves using our imaginations to 
transform ourselves into the figures being described. When reading Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, for 
example, I engage in pretense if I contemplate what it would be like to live in Anna’s shoes. I 




mentally pull myself out of my own situation and put myself into hers. In the most radical version 
of this exercise, I strip off all my character traits—everything that makes me who I am. I replace 
them with the traits Tolstoy has given Anna. I attempt to think, feel and experience the world exactly 
as she does.  
Camp’s second way of seeing ourselves in literary characters is ‘metaphorical seeing-as.’ It 
brings us closer to the idea Kierkegaard has in mind. Instead of putting myself in Anna's shoes so I 
can understand her life, I use Tolstoy’s description of Anna to help me understand my own life. Her 
story becomes a pattern for structuring and organizing my own. I come to see my troubles in terms 
of her troubles and my choices in terms of her choices. As a result, my image of myself becomes 
‘transfigured,’ to use Arthur Danto’s word. I gain a new picture of who I am. New aspects of my 
identity come to the forefront and new connections between moments in my life solidify. It may 
become apparent, for example, that like Anna I too can be driven to fits of jealousy when my goals 
are threatened, or that I too have pursued romantic love to the detriment of my own well-being. 
5.1. DAVID AND BATHSHEBA 
Kierkegaard provides us with several of his own examples of metaphorical seeing-as. One of the 
most revealing occurs in For Self-Examination, where we find his rendition of the story of David and 
Bathsheba (FSE, 37-39 / SKS 13, 64-65). The outlines of the story are well-known. Although King 
David has many wives, he becomes smitten by the beautiful Bathsheba, who is herself already 
married to another. Unable to resist her charms, David has Bathsheba brought to the palace so he 
can sleep with her. As part of the cover up for his adultery, he arranges for Bathsheba’s husband, 
Uriah, to be moved to the front lines of a battle where the fighting is fierce and he is soon killed. 
God sends the prophet Nathan to help David see the error of his ways. But rather than 
coming right out and admonishing David, Nathan offers him a parable. It is a tale about a rich man 
who must prepare a meal for a traveller. In a fit of selfishness, the rich man decides to forgo 
slaughtering any of his own many animals for the feast. Instead he seizes his poor neighbour’s one 
and only ewe lamb, whom the neighbour has loved and treated like a daughter. 
On Kierkegaard’s re-telling of the Biblical account, David becomes enamoured with 
Nathan’s tale. He praises its literary richness and offers Nathan advice about how to make it more 
interesting. But then Nathan utters the famous words—‘thou art the man’—and David’s perspective 
shifts. He suddenly sees himself as the metaphorical target of the parable. The rich man’s actions 
and his callous insensitivity to how his greed harms the less fortunate become a lens through which 
David sees himself. They focus his attention on his own selfishness with Bathsheba and his own 
insensitivity to the suffering of Uriah. With his sins in view, David repents. 
5.2. BEYOND LITERATURE 
Kierkegaard, like Camp, focuses on literature when making his case for the cognitive value of art. 
He is less sanguine about other types of art. Following a 19th century trend, his comments about the 
revelatory powers of painting and sculpture in particular are negative (EO 1, 49-57 / SKS 2, 57-65; 
EO 2, 133-139 / SKS 3, 132-137; see Fried 2002, pp. 141–166; James 2008). But I believe it is a 
mistake on Kierkegaard’s part to downplay the power of painting and sculpture. They too can 




provide us with lenses or prisms that help us restructure our vision of ourselves. They too can work 
as mirrors that reflect back transfigured images of our lives—images that afford us new ways to 
conceive of who we are. 
Consider one of Caravaggio’s final paintings, The Denial of Saint Peter (1610). It depicts a 
scene found in all four gospels from the last day of Jesus’s life. After Jesus is betrayed and arrested, 
Peter follows him into the courtyard of the high priest. Over the course of the evening, three people 
accuse Peter of belonging to Jesus’s group of disciples. Peter denies the charge each time. He thereby 
fulfils Jesus’s prophesy that he would be denied thrice before the cock crowed.  
In The Denial of Saint Peter, Caravaggio paints one of the accusations. He has close-cropped 
three figures—an indicting servant girl, an inquiring soldier whom the girl has summoned, and Peter 
himself—so each appears at half-length. The light is cast so that the girl and the soldier are in the 
dark. We barely see the questioning finger of the soldier or the two pointing fingers of the servant 
girl. Instead, Caravaggio highlights Peter’s indignant scowl along with his hands, which he has folded 
inward toward his chest as if to say, ‘Who me?’ 
The power of the painting lies in its ability to communicate more than just Peter’s physical 
appearance. As explained by Keith Christiansen (2017), the curator of the exhibit at the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art in New York where the painting hangs, Caravaggio ‘probes with unparalleled 
poignancy a dark world burdened by guilt and doom.’ He has rendered Peter’s outward visage in 
such a way that it provides a window into his inner mental state. We see in Peter’s defiant facial 
expression an anticipation of his coming remorse. 
When we contemplate Peter’s emotional state, our mirror neurons fire, leading us to 
empathize with his distress. The terror-cum-regret that overcame him washes over us as well. These 
powerful emotional tremors pave the way for associated memories. We find ourselves thinking of 
moments when we too have denied the ones we love in order to save ourselves. In this way, 
Caravaggio sheds light not only on the life of Saint Peter but on our lives as well. His painting works 
as a mirror that reflects back on us viewers the truth about who we are. Thus, we discover in Peter’s 
denial of Jesus our own failings, just as David saw his failings in the sins of the rich man from 
Nathan’s parable. 
6. ART, SCIENCE, AND PHILOSOPHY 
I have been expanding on Kierkegaard’s cognitivist view of the arts. In particular, I have been 
elaborating on what he means when he says that art teaches us indirectly rather than directly. But 
there is another feature of Kierkegaard’s view that deserves attention. He does not merely maintain 
that art’s mode of instruction is different than the one we typically find in philosophy and the sciences. 
He also holds that art’s mode of instruction is better. 
Kierkegaard here inverts another popular line of thinking. Many philosophers have held that 
insofar as art teaches at all it does so in a deficient manner. It would be better if artists were more 
straightforward about their lessons—if they came right out and told us what we needed to know 
and gave us clear reasons for why we should believe them. Indeed, this is why Hegel held that the 
messages communicated in works of art ultimately need to be clarified and justified by philosophy 
and the sciences. Kierkegaard’s insight is that Hegel and likeminded thinkers have it backward. Art 




is not held back by its indirect method of instruction but is better because of it. Art’s indirectness, 
in other words, is not a defect but a virtue. It is something that makes art’s mode of instruction 
superior to that provided by philosophy and the sciences. 
Kierkegaard provides several defences of this claim (see Aumann 2010; Tietjen 2013, pp. 
49–60). One of the most prominent is that art’s indirect approach is pedagogically superior to more 
direct approaches. It is simply a more effective way to help people learn. Kierkegaard’s argument 
here revolves around two claims. First, an indirect method of teaching is better than a direct method 
because it requires learners to become more actively engaged in the learning process. In line with 
contemporary educational theory, Kierkegaard maintains that a lesson is more likely to hit home 
and stick with people when they have to discover it for themselves than when it is handed to them. 
In Kierkegaard’s language, learners are less likely to end up with ‘rote understanding’ this way (PV, 
41-55 / SKS 16, 23-36; CUP, 1.72-80, 277-78 / SKS 7, 72-80, 251-254; TDIO, 37-38 / SKS 5, 416). 
Second, although there are several ways to undertake the indirect method of instruction, 
artistic ways are often the best. The reason is that artistic instruction is more responsive to our 
nature as human beings (PV, 54 / SKS 16, 35). In particular, it better accommodates the fact that 
we are not computers or robots who process ideas in a strictly logical way. Our passions, emotions, 
and imaginations all play roles in our decision making processes. The value of art over philosophy 
and the sciences is that it has the ability to engage us on all these levels. Art addresses ‘the whole 
person,’ as the popular phrase has it. Appreciating the force of this claim requires a detour through 
Kierkegaard’s account of human nature. 
7. KIERKEGAARD ON HUMAN NATURE 
The centrepiece of Kierkegaard’s view of human nature is that we are not purely rational creatures. 
Proof of this claim lies in the kind of errors we commit. If we were purely rational, Kierkegaard 
avers, incoming information would always perfectly translate into action and belief (CUP, 1.22 / 
SKS 7, 30; SUD, 92-96 / SKS 11, 205-208). We would always do what we took to be good and 
always believe what appeared to us to be true. Thus, any mistakes would be the result of a lack of 
education. We would do evil only because we did not yet know what the good really was. So too, 
we would believe falsehoods only because we had not yet been taught what was actually true. All 
sin, to put the point how Anti-Climacus does, would be a matter of ignorance (SUD, 95 / SKS 11, 
207). 
But this is not how things go. Our problem as human beings is not always a lack of 
knowledge or education (CUP, 1.242, 249-50 / SKS 7, 220, 226-227). We sometimes fail to do what 
we take to be right or intentionally do what we know is wrong  (SUD, 90 / SKS 11, 203; TDIO, 
100 / SKS 5, 467; see Kosch 2006, pp. 170–171). In addition, we find ourselves believing what deep 
down we are aware is false or failing to believe what in a sense we recognize is correct. These 
possibilities—weakness of the will, radical evil, and self-deception—all show that we are not purely 
rational creatures. Other faculties play a role in our decision-making and belief-forming processes. 





To be a human being, for Kierkegaard, is also to be a passionate being (TA, 61-69 / SKS 8, 59-66; 
CUP, 1.33, 130-131, 311 / SKS 7, 39, 122-123, 283-284; see Evans 2009, pp. 21–22; Walsh 1994, 
pp. 200–202). In other words, a genuinely human existence is one that involves caring about things. 
It is a matter of taking things to be of significance and regarding them as worth structuring our life 
around. We are passionate in the relevant sense, Johannes Climacus says, if we are willing to take 
risks for things, venture for them, or pursue them at great cost to ourselves (CUP 200-204 / SKS 
7, 183-186). 
To say we are passionate beings is not to say we are all already properly passionate. The 
problem with many of us is that we do not have enough passion. Indeed, Kierkegaard often 
complains that his age is a tepid one (TA, 68 / SKS 8, 66). ‘What our age needs is pathos,’ he writes 
in his journals, ‘just as scurvy needs green vegetables’ (JP, 3.428 / SKS 20, 119). Climacus goes so 
far as to say that most people have forgotten what it is to be passionate and thus have forgotten 
what it is to be human (CUP, 1.242 / SKS 7, 220). 
Contrary to some readings (e.g. Dreyfus 1999), Kierkegaard does not recommend that we 
be passionate about just any old thing. Although he does suggest caring about something is better 
than caring about nothing, he believes the object of our cares matters (CUP, 1.201 / SKS 7, 184; 
JP, 3.427 / SKS 18, 217). For instance, he laments that some people place too much emphasis on 
abstract reflection (CUP, 249 / SKS 7, 226-227). He chastises others for being preoccupied with 
mundane worldly affairs (SUD, 48 / SKS 11, 163; CD, 124 / SKS 10, 135). Perhaps Kierkegaard’s 
favourite whipping boy, however, is the person who obsess over what ‘the crowd’ thinks, something 
he believes ought not to concern us at all (PV, 106-112 / SKS 16, 86-92; UDVS, 95-96 / 8, 199-
200). 
In Kierkegaard’s mind, what we ought to care about are ethical and religious matters. We 
ought to devote ourselves to doing the good, loving our neighbour, and abiding by God’s will 
(UDVS, 24-30 / SKS 8, 139-148; WL, 44-60 / SKS 9, 51-67). Relatedly, we should care about 
developing our identities in an ethical and religious direction. We should focus our attention on the 
goal of becoming ideal versions of ourselves (CUP, 1.130 / SKS 7, 122; EO 2, 178 / SKS 3, 173-
174; see Stokes 2009, pp. 63–64). 
7.2. EMOTION 
Kierkegaard does not just advocate for the importance of passion in the sense of care or devotion. He 
also regards passion in the sense of emotion or feeling as a crucial component of human nature (Furtak 
2005, pp. 45–51; Strelis 2013; Evans 2009, p. 113). In fact, one of the mistakes Kierkegaard harps 
upon is the attempt to bracket our emotions from our inquiries (CUP, 1.32-34, 350-351 / SKS 7, 
38-40, 320-321). Under the sway of the Platonic tradition, he thinks we often attempt to approach 
issues from a dispassionate point of view (CUP, 1.253 / SKS 7, 230). In part this means we try not 
to let our own personal interests and agendas—our ‘passions’ in the first sense of the term—
interfere with our judgments about what is right or true. But it also means we try to keep our 
emotions out of it. We aim to think and reason with an even-keeled or placid disposition. 




Kierkegaard has two problems with our pursuit of this sort of objectivity. First, he maintains 
that being completely dispassionate and disinterested is impossible. We never approach anything 
with perfect neutrality. Indeed, it is a fundamental feature of human consciousness that we are 
always in some way ‘interested’ in the issues we think about (JC, 170 / SKS 15, 57; see Stokes 2009, 
pp. 47–60). We always approach them against the backdrop of pre-existing concerns and so we 
always possess a variety of emotional attitudes toward them (EO 2, 164 / SKS 3, 161; see Ferreira 
1991, pp. 125–127). 
Second, Kierkegaard believes that to the degree it is possible to become dispassionate, doing 
so is often a mistake. As Rick Furtak (2005, pp. 48–50, 2008, pp. 59–66) has shown, Kierkegaard 
embraces a perceptual theory of the emotions according to which our emotions can help us see the 
world better. They can serve as lenses that focus our attention. In particular, they can put in sharp 
relief the value or significance of what we encounter. Kierkegaard goes so far as to say that 
‘fundamentally all understanding depends upon how one is disposed toward something’ (JP, 4.354 
/ SKS 23, 24-25). As such, ‘a person’s inner being…determines what he discovers and what he 
hides’ (EUD, 60 / SKS 5, 70). 
7.3. IMAGINATION 
One final faculty Kierkegaard discusses is the imagination. He identifies it as our ability to see 
possibilities or make images of possibilities (SUD, 31 / SKS 11, 147; see Frances 2014; Grøn 2002). 
Of particular importance for Kierkegaard is the role the imagination plays in helping us come up 
with possible ways to live. Included under this umbrella is possible ways we can think, reason, feel, 
and care. Thus, our imagination shapes and delimits what we can do with all our faculties. It is ‘the 
capacity instar omnium [for all capacities]’ (SUD, 31 / SKS 11, 147). As we read in Sickness Unto Death, 
‘When all is said and done, whatever of feeling, knowing, and willing a person has depends upon 
what imagination he has’ (SUD, 31 / SKS 11, 147). 
Kierkegaard’s respect for the power of imagination leads him to worry about its misuse 
(Söderquist 2016, p. xiv; Stokes 2009, p. 75). For instance, Anti-Climacus notes with consternation 
how many of us get caught up in fantasies about ourselves. We let ourselves be seduced by stories 
about who we are that are loftier (or lower) than the facts allow. Those of us who succumb to such 
illusions are said to suffer from ‘the despair of infinitude’ (SUD, 30-33 / SKS 11, 146-148).  This 
phrase is meant to capture the idea that we have failed to ground our identity in the finite realm of 
the actual world. 
Just as often, however, Kierkegaard thinks we err on the opposite side. We go astray not 
because of an excess of imagination but because of a lack of imagination. In the most troubling case, 
we become small-minded about our own possibilities (SUD, 33-35 / SKS 11, 149-151). We wrongly 
restrict our sense of what we can do with our lives to what society tells us. We confine our vision 
of whom we might become to the options the media or the public deems acceptable. As a result, 
we fail to pursue paths that might be more appropriate for us as unique individuals. 




8. THE PEDAGOGICAL SUPERIORITY OF ART 
With Kierkegaard’s view of human nature in hand, we are in position to appreciate his argument for 
the pedagogical superiority of art. His guiding insight, once again, is that teachers ought to use a 
mode of instruction that is responsive to our nature as human beings. He concedes that if we were 
purely rational creatures, it might be appropriate to engage us on an entirely rational level (PV, 53-
54 / SKS 16, 35). It might be fitting to adhere to the ideal of direct communication and offer us 
only theses and justifications. For we could be counted on to transform this information into right 
action and right belief. As it happens, though, we are not purely rational creatures. Passion, emotion, 
and imagination also play important roles in our decision making and belief-forming processes. 
Therefore, we need a mode of instruction that engages us on all these levels as well.  
It is here that fine art comes into play. Works of art are powerful educators, for Kierkegaard, 
because they do not engage us only on a rational level. They help us to imagine what it would be 
like to occupy perspectives other than our own, as we see with Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina. Works of 
art also evoke powerful emotions in us and these emotions focus and refine our view of the world. 
They disclose aspects of it we would miss if we remained dispassionate. Moreover, because art 
conveys ideas in an emotional medium, these ideas become embedded in our minds. They sink in 
more deeply than they would if they had been conveyed prosaically. This is why Caravaggio’s 
painting, The Denial of Saint Peter, has such staying power. The vision of life it affords lingers in our 
minds because it reaches us on an affective level. Finally, because art engages our imaginations and 
emotions, it also moves our passions. The parable Nathan offers David shows how, more effectively 
than the street corner evangelist’s harangues, art can make us care in new ways about new things 
(PV, 41-53 / SKS 16, 23-36; BA, 16 / SKS 15, 101-102; see Aumann 2010, pp. 317–324). 
We can now see why Kierkegaard regards Hegel’s view as backwards when it comes to art. 
The very features of art that led Hegel to say it was an ineffective guide compared to philosophy 
and science are what make it so potent in Kierkegaard’s mind. Art’s engagement with our passions 
and emotions is not a reason to be suspicious of its ability to teach us. Quite the opposite. It is 
precisely why art is the superior mode of instruction. 
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